Real Options: Risk-free and Market  Interest Rates by Lewis, Neal et al.
 1 
Real Options: Risk-free and Market Interest Rates  
 
Neal Lewis, Ph.D., University of Bridgeport 
Ted Eschenbach, Ph.D., P.E., TGE Consulting 
Joseph C. Hartman, Ph.D., P.E., University of Florida 
 
 
Abstract 
Traditionally, present worth is computed with a single 
interest rate. However, the real options literature 
includes examples where “first” costs are discounted 
using a continuous risk-free interest rate while later 
revenues are discounted using discrete market interest 
rates.  This begs the questions of why, how common, 
and how important are these interest rate assumptions? 
This paper analyzes real option articles in leading 
finance journals and The Engineering Economist to (1) 
establish the range of assumptions that have been used, 
(2) estimate their relative frequencies, and (3) 
illuminate the difference in approaches between 
finance and engineering economy.  This paper also 
analyzes a realistic delay option example.  Sensitivity 
analysis allows us to examine when and if the 
difference in interest rate assumptions leads to different 
recommendations and what aspects of the problem 
drive changes in those recommendations. In conclusion 
we make recommendations regarding the use of 
multiple discount rates for determining NPV. 
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Introduction 
Discounted cash flow techniques are the most widely 
used methods for determining the value of a project.  
These techniques include net present value (NPV), 
internal rate of return (IRR), and others.  NPV is 
determined by discounting forecasted future net 
revenues by a required rate of return, as in equation (1): 
 
  
0
(1 )
N
t
t
CF
NPV I
r
 (1) 
where 
 I0 is the investment 
 CFt is the future cash flow 
 r is the discount rate 
 t is the time period 
 N is the number of time periods 
 
The required rate of return is often the weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC) or a higher „hurdle 
rate‟ that is the WACC adjusted for various risk 
factors.  The WACC is defined in equation (2).  Some 
textbook presentations separate equity into preferred 
stock, common stock, and retained earnings.  However, 
as described in Eschenbach and Whittaker (2003), the 
presence of treasury stock commingles equity so that it 
cannot realistically be separated. 
 
 WACC = wdkd(1-T) + weke (2) 
where 
 wd is the weighting for debt 
 kd is the before-tax cost of debt (in percent) 
 T is the tax rate 
 we is the weighting for equity 
 ke is the cost of equity (in percent) 
 
Despite being widely embraced by academia and 
industry, discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis has been 
criticized by proponents of real options analysis for 
biasing evaluators toward conservative conclusions 
(Copeland & Antikarov, 2003).  In reality, 
management has options of making changes during the 
life of the project, especially during the early stages.  
Real options analysis is a tool intended to place a value 
on the managerial flexibility in future choices 
(Trigeorgis, 1993).  The option creates an expanded net 
present value, defined as (Trigeorgis, 1996): 
   
 ENPV = NPV + Option Value (3) 
 
There are five variables that are involved in 
determining an option value:  S0, present value of 
future net revenues; X, investment costs; t, the time 
horizon; r, interest rate and σ, volatility of the project‟s 
rate of return.  Note that the first four of these are the 
same as those used to determine NPV. 
It is at this stage that different authors make 
different assumptions about interest rates.  For 
example, S0, the present value of future net revenues is 
often calculated with a discrete hurdle rate; while r is 
often a continuous, risk-free rate applied to the cost to 
build the project. 
The Black-Scholes pricing model (Black & 
Scholes, 1973) can be used to determine the value, C, 
of a simple call option.  This model has been expanded 
to include the cost of waiting (W) as shown in 
equations (4), (5), and (6).  The necessity of and 
models for including waiting costs are presented in 
Eschenbach et al. (2009a).  Note that most of these 
variables are the same as those used in the net present 
value equation. 
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where )( xd is the cumulative standard normal 
distribution of dx   
Alternatively, the option value can be computed using 
binomial lattices, as detailed in Mun (2006). 
Copeland and Antikarov (2003) developed a four-
step process to carry out a real options analysis.  The 
steps include: 
 
1. Compute the present value without flexibility 
using discounted cash flow.  
2. Model the uncertainty using decision trees.   
3. Identify and incorporate the managerial 
flexibilities. 
4. Conduct real options analysis. 
 
With this definition, it is clear that options analysis 
does not replace net present value; it builds on it.   
Future net revenues must be discounted to the 
present time.  Costs may occur in the future, and if so, 
must also be discounted to the present.  An appropriate 
discount rate must be determined for use in the 
discounting calculation.  Some authors have 
recommended using market rates (hurdle rates) for 
discounting future net revenues, while using risk-free 
rates for discounting costs.  This is often done when 
computing option values, whether using the Black-
Scholes equation or binomial lattices.  This paper 
focuses on the recommendation of using multiple 
discount rates for determining the net present value. 
In this paper, we examine the question of what 
interest rates should be used to discount future net 
revenues and future costs.  The finance and engineering 
economics literature is first reviewed, along with 
practitioner guidebooks.  A realistic deferral option is 
analyzed using two approaches to determine the impact 
of using multiple hurdle rates in the fashion 
recommended.  The issue is discussed, and 
recommendations are made regarding the use of 
multiple discount rates for determining NPV. 
 
Literature Review 
In engineering economics, accepted projects generally 
meet or exceed some threshold of growth.  This 
ensures that the company will grow at, or better than, 
its expected rate.  We use the term minimum attractive 
rate of return, or MARR, because it is the minimum 
rate of growth that a company will accept from its 
invested projects (Hartman, 2007).  The MARR is 
greater than the cost of capital as the MARR must 
allow for sufficient returns to pay back the cost of 
capital and still support firm growth. 
The nominal rate of return that we would expect 
on an investment is made of three parts:  risk-free 
return, inflation, and a risk premium (Park, 2007).  The 
real rate of return is the two parts of return over 
inflation.  It is common for costs and revenues to be 
estimated in constant-dollar terms.  If this is done, then 
market interest rates must be real rates of return over 
inflation, not nominal rates. 
If a firm wants to increase its growth rate, then it 
will want to fund projects that have a higher level of 
return.  Many firms impose a risk premium as a hedge 
against risk (and as a hedge against overly optimistic 
claims of project managers!), requiring high rates of 
return for high-risk projects.  This higher interest rate is 
commonly called the hurdle rate. 
There are several views within the engineering 
economy literature regarding how MARR should be 
determined (Eschenbach & Allen, 2002).  These 
include basing MARR on the cost of capital, or basing 
MARR on the opportunity cost (ranking projects either 
on internal rate of return or present worth).  While this 
debate is outside the scope of this paper, it can be said 
that the engineering economy literature offers multiple 
methods of determining a MARR, without consensus 
on a single method.  However, this literature does 
generally support use of a single interest rate to 
evaluate a project. 
The financial literature clearly bases the chosen 
interest rate on the weighted average cost of capital.  
However, different projects have different risks, and a 
project‟s hurdle rate may be chosen to reflect the risk 
of the project, not the risk of the firm‟s average project 
as reflected in its composite WACC (Brigham & 
Houston, 2009).  A firm‟s WACC is used to evaluate 
most projects, but if a project has an especially high or 
low risk, the hurdle rate may be adjusted up or down to 
account for this risk. 
Many firms traditionally use a single hurdle rate 
based on their firm‟s WACC.  Some firms have 
multiple divisions, and sometimes these different 
divisions define very different investment risks from 
each other.  In this case, a single WACC or a single 
hurdle rate may not be appropriate for every division 
within the firm.  The finance literature has long held 
that many firms use multiple hurdle rates (Brigham, 
1975), so there may be division specific hurdle rates, 
sometimes called a Divisional WACC (Titman & 
Martin, 2008).  Many companies adjust for project risk 
by defining risk types, and assigning a unique hurdle 
rate to each type of risk.  For example, a replacement 
project may carry a hurdle rate of 6.5%, a cost 
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reduction project 7.0%, and a new product may require 
a risk-adjusted rate of 14.0% (Higgins, 2009).  Specific 
projects may also be assigned a unique hurdle rate 
based on risk and how the project is financed.  This 
process is not universally supported (Reimann, 1990). 
Myers (1974) recommended an “adjusted present 
value” (APV) to differentiate the appropriate discount 
rates between high and low risk projects within a firm.  
Myers recommended one discount rate for cash flows 
and another for “side effects” such as tax shields (the 
tax benefit of using debt).  In essence, rather than 
combining all forms of financing into one WACC, he 
recommends breaking out the different discount rates 
and calculating the present worth of the individual 
parts (using separate discount rates), then adding them 
together to determine the APV.  Over the years, this 
approach has received modest support in the literature 
(Ezzell, 1984; Trigeorgis, 1993). Luehrman more 
recently recommended using APV for valuing 
operations and projects (Luehrman, 1997a; Luehrman, 
1997b). 
Luehrman expanded on this APV concept within 
the real options framework.  When determining the 
NPV of a real option problem, he recommends 
discounting future net revenues by a market-based 
hurdle rate, while discounting costs by the risk-free rate 
(Luehrman, 1998).  This is similar to what is usually 
done within the option value calculation. 
This recommendation has appeared in books.  Mun 
(2006) continues this recommendation of discounting 
costs by the risk-free rate while discounting revenues 
by a higher market-based rate within the same NPV 
equation.  Park (2007) also recommends this technique. 
However, this approach of using multiple discount 
rates for determining a project‟s NPV has not received 
wide acceptance.  This recommendation has not been 
found in The Engineering Economist, nor has it 
appeared widely in the finance literature. 
In Lewis, Eschenbach, and Hartman (2009b) we 
address the question of discrete versus continuous 
compounding.  For clarity that issue is not addressed 
here. 
Before we try to reach a conclusion on the 
theoretical soundness of these various choices, let us 
examine a case study to see how much this might 
matter. 
 
Case Study 
An oil exploration company is considering leasing a 
plot of land and drilling an oil well.  The well is 
expected to have characteristics that are typical of this 
company‟s projects, and the equipment sizing, outputs, 
and costs are well understood.  The characteristics of 
the project are shown in Exhibit 1. 
The first step is to determine the NPV of the 
project. Note that in addition to the initial investment 
of $57 million, there will be an additional salvage cost 
of $10 million at the end of the project to return the site 
to its original condition (which will be discounted as a 
future cash flow).  The output of the well will begin in 
Year 2, but the output declines at 15% per year.  The 
well will produce for seven years before it is shut 
down.  Cash flows are shown in Exhibit 2.  In reality, 
original investment costs may be spread over multiple 
years, and work-overs and other investments may 
increase later recoveries and extend the life.  But this 
model is a good conceptual model of the initial 
decision. 
 
Exhibit 1.  Oil Well Project Information. 
 
First cost 
Oil price 
Oil price volatility 
Project volatility 
$57 million 
$50/bbl 
35% 
To be determined 
Salvage cost $10 million 
Output, yr 1, 106 
bbls/yr 
0.60 
Well depletion 
rate/yr 
15% 
Operating costs $10/bbl 
Hurdle rate 16% 
Risk-free rate 5% 
Project delay Up to 2 years 
 
 
Exhibit 2.  Project Cash Flows, millions of dollars. 
 Year Invest Now Delay (up to 2 years) 
0 −57.00 0 
1 0 0 
2 24.00 −57.00 
3 20.40 0 
4 17.34 24.00 
5 14.74 20.40 
6 12.53 17.34 
7 10.65 14.74 
8 9.05 12.53 
9 −10.00 10.65 
10  9.05 
11  −10.00 
 
 
There is an additional cost if the project is delayed:  the 
cost of the lease.  The lease is considered an investment 
cost, part of the cost of delaying the project.  This lease 
cost is bounded by the option value; if the actual lease 
cost is greater than the ENPV, then the option should 
not be pursued. 
 
NPV for delayed project.  The NPV can be 
determined using equation (1) given the hurdle rate of 
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16% and assuming that there is no delay in the project.  
If the project were started now, it would have an NPV 
of −$0.46 million.  The well is not worth starting given 
the current price of oil. 
The company has several options.  First, it could 
invest in the project; however, the NPV is negative, 
making this unattractive.  Second, the company can 
abandon the project, as suggested by the NPV.  Third, 
the company could keep the project open by paying a 
lease on the property, investing later only if prices 
increase enough in the future to make investment 
economical.  By paying the lease, the company can pay 
a relatively small premium (the lease) to preserve the 
option of future investment.  The question is: how 
much should the company be willing to spend to keep 
the option (the project) open by paying a lease?  This is 
a real option problem; the firm should be willing to pay 
up to the project‟s ENPV to keep the option open. 
Part of the evaluation is to determine what the 
NPV of the project would be if it were delayed for two 
years.  Rather than determining the option value here, 
we will focus first on the NPV of the delayed project. 
Traditional methods dictate that we discount all of 
the cash flows, including the investment, found in the 
“Delay” column of Exhibit 2.  One discount rate of 
16% is used.  This provides a delayed NPV of −$0.34 
million.  If the first costs are discounted by the risk-free 
interest rate of 5%, this NPV becomes −$9.68 million, 
which is considerably lower. 
The effect of the discount rate on the NPV of the 
delayed project is shown in Exhibit 3.  Discounting the 
first cost by the risk-free rate has a significant negative 
effect on the present worth of the project, leading to 
ultra conservative recommendations.  Even though the 
investment costs are near time zero and will not be 
discounted much, they are barely discounted with the 
low rate.  Normally, we increase the rate on future 
returns to discount them because they are risky.  This is 
the opposite.  The risk premium on investment flows is 
eliminated with the lower rates because they are 
negative, keeping the NPV more negative. 
 
Exhibit 3.  Effect of interest rates on NPV. 
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While very few would believe an argument that 
the future cost to drill an oil well is risk-free, it is 
certainly much less risky than the returns for drilling 
the well which depend on an uncertain geology and an 
uncertain future price of the oil. 
 
Real option calculation for delay example.  Some 
of the first applications of real options analysis 
involved natural resource projects.  This is largely 
because there was a foundation for determining project 
volatility:  commodity price fluctuations.  As most of 
the examples we've analyzed with real options have led 
to questions about one or more points of "standard 
practice," this example has been selected as the best 
hope for a "good" example of the effectiveness of real 
options. The example presented here is analyzed along 
the lines of conventional practice. We do have 
unanswered questions about this approach, but it still is 
an effective example to describe conventional practice. 
Before the option value can be determined, the 
volatility of the project must be estimated.  Project 
volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the rate 
of return of the project.  We have only one source of 
uncertainty:  the price of oil, which has a standard 
deviation of 0.35.  Project volatility is usually higher 
than the volatility of any input, so a value greater than 
0.35 would be a logical initial estimate.  
The most widely used approach is the logarithmic 
present value of returns (Copeland and Antikarov, 
2003).  (For a detailed discussion of volatility, see 
Lewis, Eschenbach, and Hartman (2008).)  The oil 
price is assumed to follow a lognormal distribution, 
since the price cannot fall below zero.  The oil prices 
are correlated 90% from year to year as the price in one 
year will tend to follow the price of the preceding year.  
Without correlation, each year‟s price would vary 
independently of preceding prices.  Without correlated 
oil prices, there is no actionable volatility due to oil 
prices, and project volatility would be meaningless 
(Lewis, et al., 2009a). 
The Black-Scholes model assumes that prices are 
lognormally distributed and follow geometric 
Brownian motion.  The binomial lattice method 
assumes the same, since the validation of the lattice 
method demonstrates that results approach the Black-
Scholes model as the number of time-steps increase.  
The lognormal and Brownian motion assumptions are 
two of the difficulties in translating financial options to 
real options; few real engineering projects have prices 
which are truly lognormal, including oil prices.  In 
reality, oil prices will be correlated from time period to 
time period, with long-term prices being mean 
reverting.  Oil prices fluctuations in 2008 were a good 
example.  One way to incorporate the mean reverting 
nature of the price is to build it into the simulation used 
for determining volatility; 0% price correlations are 
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100% mean reverting with the beginning of the next 
time period, while 100% price correlations are not 
mean reverting at all.  An open question remains as to 
what is the best value to use.  It is difficult to model 
future oil prices to obtain a meaningful option value.  
The details of the volatility calculation are outside 
of the scope of this paper.  The project‟s volatility is 
determined to be 0.435 annually, somewhat higher than 
the 0.35 volatility of the price of oil. 
 The option value can be determined using the 
modified Black-Scholes method, shown in equations 
(4), (5), and (6).  The time variable is the time that the 
project can be delayed.  The original Black-Scholes 
model assumes a European option; one which can only 
be exercised upon maturity.  Here we have an 
American option; one which can be exercised at any 
time up to the expiration date. Merton (1973) pointed 
out that exercising an option early has no value unless 
there is a dividend (a loss in value due to waiting).  
However, we have found that all deferral options on 
real projects have a cost of delay. 
Waiting costs can be modeled for a European 
option without too much difficulty.  Delays are known, 
and lost or deferred cash flows can be modeled based 
on the delay (Eschenbach, Lewis, and Hartman, 
2009a).  In the present case, we have an American 
option, where the firm is waiting for the price of oil to 
increase to the point where it is economic to pursue the 
project.  What is the waiting cost in this case?  It 
depends on how long the project is delayed, leasing 
costs, the price of oil when the project is implemented, 
and what occurs with oil prices in the future. 
If the project is not delayed, there is no cost of 
waiting.  If the current case is delayed the full two 
years, there would be a cost of waiting of $14.52 
million (the NPV of the incremental net revenues).  A 
delay of less than two years results in a smaller cost of 
waiting, but also a smaller option value.  The 
traditional approach is to model the delay to its 
maximum length of time and use the largest possible 
option value, inflating the true value of the option.   
Substituting our values into equation (5) and (6), 
we find  
 
03.0
2435.0
22435.005.0
57
52.1454.56ln 2
1d
 
1 0.03d  
 
64.02435.012 dd  
 
Substituting our values into equation (4), the option 
value is 
 
0.05(2)(56.54 14.52) ( 0.03) 57 ( 0.64)
42.02(0.49) 57(0.905)(0.26) 7.18
C e
C
 
The value of the option is $7.18 million.  Note that this 
is the maximum value of the option, assuming the 
option is kept open for the full two years.  In reality, 
the option will be worth less than this, but given the 
state of the art, we cannot say how much less.  In other 
words, we don‟t really know (or trust) the value of the 
option.   
 
Discussion 
As noted earlier, Luehrman, Mun, and Park 
recommend that multiple interest rates be used for 
determining the NPV of real options problems.  
Specifically, they recommend that future net revenues 
be discounted at a risk-adjusted hurdle rate while future 
costs be discounted at a risk-free rate.  This is not just a 
real options issue, it is an issue which could impact any 
discounted cash flow calculation.   
Using multiple discount rates is not a new idea, 
and in general is theoretically supportable.  The 
proposed idea stems from the belief that future 
revenues are risky while costs are not.  We agree that 
future revenues are risky and should be discounted at 
an appropriate risk-adjusted interest rate.  However, we 
believe that future costs are also risky, and should also 
be discounted at a risk-adjusted rate, not at a risk free 
rate.  Determining this rate is outside of the scope of 
this paper. 
Recent work has shown that most companies do 
not use multiple discount rates.  In a 2003 survey, over 
half of the responding companies use a single discount 
rate for the entire firm based on WACC, and only 14% 
of companies use an objective measure of risk to 
determine their discount rate (Block, 2003).  While the 
academic literature has pursued the idea of multiple 
risk-based discount rates, the corporate world has not 
kept pace. 
The recommendation of using the risk-free interest 
rate to discount future costs assumes that future costs 
are known and are risk free.  While costs may be less 
risky than future revenues, we disagree that future costs 
are known.  Any project manager knows that costs are 
not absolutely firm, no matter what the budget may 
say.  For example, many projects saw very large 
increases in projected costs for cement and steel 
products, which then fell during the recent economic 
downturn.  Similarly, project costs having an energy or 
transportation component saw high inflation during the 
first part of 2008 (and did not necessarily see deflated 
costs as fuel prices fell).  These costs were far from 
risk-free, even those spanning just a few weeks or 
months.  Future costs are clearly not risk-free. 
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The recommendation of using the risk-free interest 
rate assumes that money can be borrowed at a risk-free 
interest rate in order to pay for the project.  This is 
simply not true.  A firm‟s WACC is far higher than the 
risk-free rate, and we know of no firm that can borrow 
money for an extended time at the risk free rate.  The 
reason is simple:  future costs are not free of risk. 
We can support using multiple hurdle rates on a 
case-by-case basis if there is a justification for doing 
so.  If the firm can identify reasonable risk-adjusted 
rates for costs and future revenues, there is no reason 
why the firm should not go ahead and do so.   
However, this implies that it might be necessary to 
separate future cash flows into production costs and 
revenue streams.  For our oil well case, the discount 
rate for costs would likely be less than the rate for 
revenues.  However, for a new product where the 
utilization of new capacity is a key uncertainty, then 
the production costs may be far “riskier” than the unit 
revenue stream.  In either case, we suggest that the 
time involved in developing this data would likely not 
be worth the time and effort involved. 
We cannot support the concept that future costs are 
without risk.  Delayed projects often have higher costs 
due to a variety of reasons.  Differential inflation is an 
obvious cause.  Delayed projects are often disbanded, 
and restarting the project often entails bringing in new 
people and repeating work that had already been done 
and lost (Eschenbach et al., 2007).   
The costs to keep an option open cannot be 
ignored (Eschenbach et al., 2009b).  Mineral and 
petroleum leases can require annual payments before 
development.  Product development that is shelved can 
require continuing licensing fees for patents.  R&D that 
is open (but not actively moving to the next stage) still 
requires personnel and lab expenses.  Land that is 
undeveloped will still have property taxes.  Keeping an 
option open is not free. 
Students in engineering economy courses are 
usually taught to use a single interest rate for 
determining present worth.  This is the most common 
method within both finance and engineering economy 
courses.  It is also the method most widely used in 
large U.S. firms.  The use of a single discount rate 
should continue to be the basis for teaching discounted 
cash flow analysis. 
   
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Discounting project costs using a risk-free rate while 
discounting future net revenues at a higher hurdle rate 
can have a dramatic influence on the NPV of a project.  
Discounting costs at a lower interest rate decreases the 
present worth of a project. 
Use of the risk-free rate for discounting costs 
assumes that future cost estimates are free of risk.  This 
is simply not true in the world of real engineering 
projects.  This practice also assumes that money can be 
obtained at the risk-free rate, which is also not true for 
firms that are not banks. 
Unless there are clear reasons for having multiple 
rates (and there may be), we recommend that the 
engineering economy community continue with the 
current practice of discounting both costs and revenues 
with one appropriate discount rate.  We do not 
recommend the use of the risk-free rate for discounting 
project costs, whether they are in a real option or 
traditional discounted cash flow analysis context. 
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